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Ripe for Refinement: The State's Role in 
Interpretation of FET, MFN, and Shareholder 
Rights  
Lise Johnson1                      
 
Note: this paper was originally prepared for a workshop on Reshaping Investment Treaties, 
supported by the Ford Foundation and co-organized by the Global Economic Governance 
Programme, the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Columbia Center for Sustainable 
Investment, and University College London. 
 
Abstract 
Over recent years, many states have taken steps to refine and modernize their investment treaties. 
They have done this to, among other things, clarify what were often vaguely worded standards, insert 
provisions on procedural and jurisdictional questions, and expand the express ability of states to issue 
binding interpretations on certain questions. Together, these reforms can help narrow states’ exposure 
to claims and liability under investment treaties. 
 
Those reforms, however, are typically only included in newer treaties or model agreements. States 
typically have legacies of existing treaties that are “old-style” and therefore are still exposed to claims, 
litigation, and potential damages awarded under those agreements. To mitigate that exposure, states 
can exercise the important powers they possess as “masters of their treaties” and use practice and 
agreement to help shape interpretation of treaty provisions. This note focuses on this strategy. In 
addition to setting out the general rules regarding state practice and agreement as a means of 
influencing treaty interpretation, it (1) identifies three issues in investment treaty law—FET, MFN, and 
shareholder rights—that may be particularly ripe for proactive efforts by states applying this 
interpretive strategy; and (2) sets out a series of questions that aim to facilitate interstate efforts to 
identify consensus on these controversial treaty provisions.  
 
 
The Global Economic Governance Programme is directed by Ngaire Woods and has been made 
possible through the generous support of Old Members of University College. Its research projects are 
principally funded by the Ford Foundation (New York), the International Development Research 
Centre (Ottawa), and the MacArthur Foundation (Chicago). 
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1. The Issue: Existing Treaties
Over recent years, many states have taken steps to refine and modernize their investment treaties. 
They have done this to, among other things, clarify what were often vaguely worded standards, insert 
provisions on procedural and jurisdictional questions, and expand the express ability of states to issue 
binding interpretations on certain questions. Together, these reforms can help narrow states’ exposure 
to claims and liability under investment treaties. 
Those reforms, however, are typically only included in newer treaties or model agreements. States 
commonly have legacies of existing treaties that are of the “old-style” and therefore are still 
exposed to claims, litigation, and potential damages awarded under those agreements. This risk is 
particularly acute given that tribunals have often permitted investors to “treaty shop” to obtain 
favorable protections, and have also permitted investors to use the most-favored nation provision to 
“import” more investor-friendly (or at least less clear) provisions from other treaties. 
The question therefore is what to do about existing treaties? There are three main options: 
 Termination
 Renegotiation (both of which can be accomplished through negotiation of a new, umbrella
treaty); and
 Interpretation
This note focuses on interpretation, which can be pursued independently or in conjunction with the 
other two strategies. Even if, for example, an agreement is terminated, it will likely have a survival 
period during which time interpretations can also apply. 
1.2 Interpretation: Exercising the powers of states as masters of their treaties 
As explained in greater detail in Annexes 1-3, under both customary international law and the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), states are considered to be “masters of their treaties”, and 
have the power to shape the interpretation of those treaties over time through their statements and 
actions.  
By taking such steps as issuing joint interpretations with their other treaty parties, exchanging 
diplomatic notes, making unilateral declarations, and submitting briefs as non-disputing parties or 
respondents, states can clarify uncertainties and ambiguities in treaty texts on a range of jurisdictional, 
procedural and substantive issues such as the meaning of the fair and equitable treatment obligation, 
the role of the most-favored nation obligation, the scope of consent to arbitration, and a range of other 
issues. Under international law on interpretation of treaties, such acts, when evidencing subsequent 
practice and subsequent agreement, must be taken into account by tribunals in disputes arising under 
those agreements.  
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Importantly, states can use their statements and actions to actively mold the agreements. 
Interpretations need not necessarily reflect or be consistent with the original intent of the parties at the 
time of signing the treaty. Rather, international law recognizes that states have the power to ensure 
that treaties remain living instruments whose meaning can evolve over time.  
But timing is important to the effectiveness and force of these interpretations. Actions taken during the 
course of a dispute to establish subsequent practice or agreement may, rightly or wrongly, be viewed 
by tribunals as improper tactics to avoid liability rather than legitimate efforts to clarify vague 
standards. Indeed, the timing of interpretations has seemed to influence both the Pope & Talbot 
tribunal’s critical view of the FTC interpretation of NAFTA Article 1105, and the United States’ view of 
Ecuador’s efforts to secure common interpretation of the “effective means” provision. Both the FTC’s 
interpretation and Ecuador’s attempt at a joint interpretation came after a tribunal had issued its 
decision on liability in favor of the claimants, and both were questioned as attempts to interfere with 
those awards.1  
To avoid these concerns, it would be ideal for states to take steps to clarify the meaning of their 
treaties on a prompt and ongoing basis, especially before disputes arise.2 Consequently, this note 
highlights certain issues that may be open and particularly ready for interpretation.  
The Global Economic Governance Programme 
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2. The Risks – Amounts, Claimants, and Claims
When thinking about the role of interpretation in clarifying provisions in investment treaties, an initial 
question that is important to consider is what are the main risks that need to be addressed. Answering 
that question requires an analysis of the 
1. treaties that are in force,
2. quantity and type of investments and investors that they protect (including as a result of treaty
shopping),
3. standards and scope of protection that are granted, and
4. uncertainties that are capable of being addressed through interpretation.
Annex 4 contains more information on analysis of the first and second factors. The remainder of this 
note focuses on the third and fourth.  
2.1 Standards of Protection 
As investment treaty arbitrations have been litigated and decided over the past 15 years, certain 
issues have emerged as being particularly controversial and significant for the scope of claims and 
likelihood of success. These include (1) use of the MFN obligation to expand the scope of 
jurisdiction/import substantive standards of protection and alter dispute settlement provisions; (2) the 
rise in investors’ use of the FET obligation to bring claims, and the expansion, at least according to 
some tribunals, of the requirements that obligation imposes on host states; (3) the expansion of “treaty 
shopping”; and (4) the ability of shareholders (including minority, non-controlling shareholders) to bring 
claims seeking relief for harms to a locally established enterprise.  
2.2 Standards Capable of Interpretation: Difference between Interpretation and Amendment 
Importantly, many of the problematic issues regarding scope and standards of protection share a 
common origin: vaguely worded treaty provisions. These vaguely worded treaty provisions have given 
rise to problems for states and investors in the form of heightened uncertainties and litigation costs, 
and have posed unique problems for states through expanded potential and actual liabilities. Investors 
and tribunals have used vague language in order to stretch treaty provisions in ways often not 
anticipated or desired by governments. 
Yet the fact that many of the problems related to investment treaties arise from vaguely worded 
provisions may actually be fortunate for states who have signed these agreements: Because many of 
the most controversial provisions do not dictate clear answers, questions as to their meaning are 
largely ones that can be addressed through interpretations, as opposed to needing to be addressed 
through formal renegotiation and amendment.3  
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3. Provisions Open for Interpretation
As noted above, there are a number of provisions (1) that have given rise to expanded actual and 
potential liabilities for states and (2) whose vague language may be ripe for further clarification. These 
clarifications can bring “old-style” treaties in line with more modern treaty practice and better express 
states’ understanding of their treaty commitments.  
Of those provisions, this note focuses on three: (1) the MFN provision; (2) the FET language; and (3) 
references to shareholder rights and remedies. For each, this note discusses the different approaches 
tribunals have taken and the positions states have adopted in their newer treaties and disputes. It 
then raises a series of questions to prompt inter-state discussion regarding the possibility for agreed 
interpretations to clarify these provisions.  
3.1 The MFN Provision 
The MFN provision has been one of the most controversial provisions in investment treaties, with 
states, investors, and tribunals contesting its meaning in myriad investor-state arbitrations to date. 
Contrary to what treaty drafters might have expected, the provision’s main use has not been in cases 
when an investor from Country X argues it was actually treated differently under the laws of the host 
country than investors from Country Y. Rather, the MFN provision has been used to stretch and 
expand the investment treaties themselves.  
More specifically, investors have used the MFN provision to try to: 
 obtain treaty coverage over assets that, under the “basic” treaty, would not qualify as
“investments”;
 import (and use ISDS to enforce) substantive standards of protection that are not included in
the “basic” treaty;
 import (and use ISDS to enforce) substantive standards of protection that are broader than
those in the “basic” treaty;
 import expanded provisions on damages and remedies;
 import “more favorable” procedural rules regarding conduct of investor-state arbitration than
the rules provided in the “basic” treaty; and
 import broader access to investor-state arbitration under the dispute resolution provisions.
3.1.1 Tribunal Decisions 
Tribunals have been relatively open to some degree of “importation”, but differ with respect to what 
types of provisions and rights can be imported.  
In some cases the tribunal have stated that the MFN provision could be used to import, and use 
ISDS to enforce, substantive obligations and standards of compensation contained in other 
treaties: 
 MFN can be used to import the umbrella clause from another treaty (Arif v. Moldova, EDF v.
Argentina).
 MFN can be used to import a more favorable FET provision from another treaty (ATA v.
Jordan; Bayindir v. Pakistan; Paushok v. Mongolia; MTD v. Chile; Rumeli Telekom v.
Kazakhstan).
The Global Economic Governance Programme 
University of Oxford 
Page 7 of 35 
Ripe for Refinement: The State's Role in Interpretation of FET, MFN, and Shareholder Rights – Lise Johnson 
© April 2015 / GEG WP101.
 MFN can be used to import “effective means” provision from another treaty (White Industries v.
India).
 MFN can be used to import the standard of compensation from another treaty (CME v. Czech
Republic).
Similarly, some tribunals have stated that the MFN provision could be used to access “more 
favourable” dispute settlement provisions such as provisions that don’t require domestic litigation 
prior to filing the claim.4 Decisions falling in this category include Garanti Koza v. Turkmenistan; Gas 
Natural v. Argentina; Hochtief v. Argentina (majority); Impregilo v. Argentina (majority); Maffezini v. 
Spain; National Grid v. Argentina; RosInvestCo v. Russia; Siemens v. Argentina; Suez v. Argentina; 
and Teinver v. Argentina.  
Tribunals have appeared most reluctant to allow investors to use the MFN provision to broaden the 
definition of covered “investments”, expand the temporal reach of the BIT, or expand the scope of 
investor-state arbitration when the treaty indicates that arbitration is only permitted for specific issues. 
In MCI v. Ecuador and Tecmed v. Mexico, for example, the tribunals rejected the claimants’ attempts 
to expand the scope of the BIT to cover events that took place prior to the treaty’s entry into force. 
And in Telenor v. Hungary and Tza Yap Shum v. Peru, the tribunals rejected the investors’ attempts to 
use the MFN provision to broaden the dispute resolution provision beyond disputes relating to the 
amount of compensation due for expropriation (cf. RosInvestCo v. Russia [reaching the opposite 
conclusion and permitting importation for this purpose]).5 
Nevertheless, arbitrators and tribunals have expressed different opinions on even these issues, 
leaving doors open for future litigation and potential acceptance of such MFN-based arguments. 
3.1.2 State Positions 
Various states have objected to or noted their disagreement with each of these uses of the MFN 
provision.  
Treaty practice 
Sometimes states have expressed this disagreement in the context of treaty negotiations. For 
example, in the US-DR-CAFTA, a note that was included as part of the negotiating history reflects the 
states’ understanding that MFN provision does not apply to international dispute resolution 
mechanisms. That note stated: 
The Most-Favored-Nation Treatment Article of this Agreement is expressly limited in its 
scope to matters ‘with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct operation and sale or other dispositions of investments.’ The 
Parties share the understanding and intent that this clause does not encompass 
international dispute resolution mechanisms such as those contained in Section C of this 
chapter, and therefore could not reasonably lead to a conclusion similar to that of the 
Maffezini case.6 
More expressly, in the Colombia-Switzerland BIT the treaty parties specifically barred application 
of MFN provision to dispute settlement mechanisms. The BIT states: 
For greater certainty, it is further understood that the most favourable nation treatment … does not 
encompass mechanisms for the settlement of investment disputes provided for in other international 
agreements concluded by the Party concerned.7 
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The January 2015 version of the investment chapter being negotiated in the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) likewise prevents use of the MFN provision to import dispute settlement 
mechanisms from other treaties, stating: 
For greater certainty, the treatment referred to in this Article does not encompass 
international dispute resolution procedures or mechanisms such as those included in 
Section B.8 
While these provisions add some clarity regarding the scope of the MFN provision, they leave open 
certain questions such as whether the MFN provision can be used to import substantive standards 
and arbitrate disputes regarding those substantive standards. 
Those questions are addressed in the recently negotiated CETA. In that agreement, Canada and 
Europe specified that the treaty’s MFN provision does not permit importation of procedural or 
substantive standards. The treaty makes clear that, by the mere act of giving investors from one 
state the ability to benefit from certain procedural or substantive protections under one investment 
treaty, the government does not give those investors “treatment” capable of being more or less 
favorable than what is provided under another investment treaty. The text of the CETA states: 
For greater certainty, the “treatment” referred to in Paragraph 1 and 2 does not include 
investor-to-state dispute settlement procedures provided for in other international 
investment treaties and other trade agreements. Substantive obligations in other 
international investment treaties and other trade agreements do not in themselves 
constitute “treatment”, and thus cannot give rise to a breach of this article, absent 
measures adopted by a Party pursuant to such obligations.9 
Submissions as respondents and non-disputing state parties 
AIn the contest of disputes, a number of states have similarly objected to interpretations of the MFN 
provision that read the clause as allowing importation of other treaty rights and protections.10 
Argentina In EDF v. Argentina, Argentina argued “that the MFN Clause is 
unable to incorporate ‘umbrella clauses’ because the question of 
whether there has been a breach of such standards does not arise 
‘in the sense of [the Argentina-France BIT].’”11 
Bolivia In Guarachi v. Bolivia, Bolivia argued that the “effective means 
standard may not be imported into the United-Kingdom-Bolivia BIT 
by way of the MFN clause, as this would also require the relevant 
negotiation process to be incorporated and applied to investors from 
the United Kingdom. Therefore, the effect of the negotiation 
prerequisite cannot be escaped merely by resorting to the MFN 
clause, especially where the purpose of such clause is to avert 
discriminatory treatment by reason of investors’ nationality.”12 
Ecuador In Perenco v. Ecuador, Ecuador rejected “any suggestion that the 
Treaty’s most favoured nation clause permits Perenco to borrow the 
provision of any other BIT signed by Ecuador that offers protections 
to indirectly controlled companies of the other State party. They 
assert[ed] that such a claim merely begs the question, because the 
MFN clause only applies to ‘nationals or companies’ within the 
meaning of the Treaty…. Perenco’s argument that Article 5 
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The second approach is to hold that the FET obligation is the same as the MST owed to aliens 
under customary international law. Under this view, when including the FET obligation in their 
treaties, states were merely incorporating the MST standard. The FET obligation encompasses the 
MST but does not go beyond it. Notably, there is evidence that such practice of expressly tethering 
the FET standard to the MST standard will lead the tribunal to interpret the scope of the FET 
obligation (and potential liability thereunder) as being narrower than under a treaty without such an 
express reference. Statistics gathered by UNCTAD suggest that inclusion of language aligning the 
FET obligation to the MST can improve states’ chances of successfully defending claims.24  
Decisions viewing the FET obligation as being tied and limited to the MST include: 
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statements regarding the underlying facts and law, and have also applied rather low thresholds for 
finding liability.  
One factor that has influenced some tribunals’ interpretations of the FET obligation is their view of the 
relation between the FET standard and the minimum standard of treatment (MST) under customary 
international law (MST). The MST is a floor below which conduct is not to fall, and is based on the 
general and consistent practices of states “accepted as law.”19 Establishment of the MST requires two 
elements: (1) evidence of state practice of sufficient “density, in terms of uniformity, extent and 
representativeness;”20 and (2) opinio juris, meaning that states follow the practice out of a sense of 
legal duty.  
There are four general approaches tribunals have taken regarding the relationship between the FET 
obligation and the floor set by the MST. The first is to hold that the FET standard does not simply 
codify the MST, but is an autonomous standard that is independent of and goes beyond the 
MST.  
Enron Creditors Recovery Corporation (formerly Enron Corporation) and Ponderosa Assets, 
L.P. v. Argentina: “It might well be that in some circumstances where the international 
minimum standard is sufficiently elaborate and clear, fair and equitable treatment might be 
equated with it. But in other more vague circumstances, the fair and equitable standard may be 
more precise than its customary international law forefathers. This is why the Tribunal 
concludes that the fair and equitable standard, at least in the context of the Treaty applicable 
to this case, can also require a treatment additional to, or beyond that of, customary law. The 
very fact that recent FTC interpretations or investment treaties have purported to change the 
meaning or extent of the standard only confirms that those specific instruments aside, the 
standard is or might be a broader one.”21 
Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentina: “The Tribunal 
sees no basis for equating principles of international law with the minimum standard of 
treatment. First, the reference to principles of international law supports a broader reading that 
invites consideration of a wider range of international law principles than the minimum standard 
alone. Second, the wording of Article 3 requires that the fair and equitable treatment conform to 
the principles of international law, but the requirement for conformity can just as readily set a 
floor as a ceiling on the Treaty’s fair and equitable treatment standard. Third, the language of 
the provision suggests that one should also look to contemporary principles of international 
law, not only to principles from almost a century ago.”22 
Perenco v. Ecuador: “With respect to the general approach to be taken to the meaning of the 
fair and equitable treatment standard, Article 4 of the Treaty requires a Contracting Party to 
accord “[fair] and equitable treatment, in accordance with the principles of international law”. 
This particular formulation of the standard is not tethered to the international minimum 
standard of treatment under customary international law.”23  
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 Glamis Gold v. United States: “[T]o violate the customary international law minimum standard
of treatment codified in Article 1105 of the NAFTA, an act must be sufficiently egregious and
shocking—a gross denial of justice, manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack
of due process, evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons—so as to fall below
accepted international standards and constitute a breach of Article 1105(1).”25
 Apotex Holdings and Apotex Inc. v. United States: “For all these reasons, the Tribunal
concludes that the Claimants have not established the existence of the specific procedural
rights required by customary international law … As the Party bearing the legal burden of
establishing its case, this determination would suffice to dismiss the Claimants’ case under
NAFTA Article 1105(1).”26
 Mobil v. Canada: What the foreign investor is entitled to under Article 1105 is that any changes
are consistent with the requirements of customary international law on fair and equitable
treatment. Those standards are set, as we have noted above, at a level which protects against
egregious behaviour. It is not the function of an arbitral tribunal established under NAFTA to
legislate a new standard which is not reflected in the existing rules of customary international
law. The Tribunal has not been provided with any material to support the conclusion that the
rules of customary international law require a legal and business environment to be maintained
or set in concrete.27
The third approach is to indicate that the difference between FET and the MST is not significant in 
practice. To some extent, this has arisen from the view that the “minimum” standard is an evolving 
concept that has expanded over time to approximate if not subsume what might previously have only 
been barred under a more exacting FET standard.28 It has also resulted from the fact that tribunals 
have not always strictly required claimants to prove the existence of state practice and opinio juris on 
a specific issue.29  
 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina: “While the choice between requiring a higher
treaty standard and that of equating it with the international minimum standard might have
relevance in the context of some disputes, the Tribunal is not persuaded that it is relevant in
this case. In fact, the Treaty standard of fair and equitable treatment and its connection with
the required stability and predictability of the business environment, founded on solemn legal
and contractual commitments, is not different from the international law minimum standard and
its evolution under customary law.”30
 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Ecuador: “The Tribunal is of the opinion
that in the instant case the Treaty standard is not different from that required under
international law concerning both the stability and predictability of the legal and business
framework of the investment. To this extent the Treaty standard can be equated with that
under international law as evidenced by the opinions of the various tribunals cited above. It is
also quite evident that the Respondent’s treatment of the investment falls below such
standards.”31
 Duke Energy Electroquil Partners and Electroquil S.A. v. Ecuador: “'[T]he minimum 
requirement to satisfy [the FET] standard has evolved and the Tribunal considers that its 
content is substantially similar whether the terms are interpreted in their ordinary meaning, as 
required by the Vienna Convention, or in accordance with customary international law.’ The 
Tribunal concurs with this statement and with the conclusion that the standards are essentially 
the same.”32
 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. Tanzania: “[T]he Arbitral Tribunal also accepts, as found
by a number of previous arbitral tribunals and commentators, that the actual content of the
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treaty standard of fair and equitable treatment is not materially different from the content of the 
minimum standard of treatment in customary international law.”33 
 Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Kazakhstan: “The
only aspect on which the parties differ is that for Respondent, the concept does not raise the
obligation upon Respondent beyond the international minimum standard of protection. The
Arbitral Tribunal considers that this precision is more theoretical than real. It shares the view of
several ICSID tribunals that the treaty standard of fair and equitable treatment is not materially
different from the minimum standard of treatment in customary international law.”34
The fourth is to not address the relationship, or to draw no clear conclusion about the relationship. 
3.2.2 State Positions 
Treaty practice 
In their newer treaties and models, a number of states, including various Latin American countries, 
have inserted language expressly indicating that the fair and equitable treatment means the 
minimum standard of treatment under customary international law. The Central America-Mexico 
FTA is one of many examples. It states:  
Artículo 11.3: Nivel Mínimo de Trato 
1. Cada Parte otorgará a las inversiones de los inversionistas de la otra Parte, un trato acorde con el
derecho internacional consuetudinario, incluido trato justo y equitativo, así como protección y 
seguridad plenas dentro de su territorio. 
2. Para mayor certeza, el párrafo 1 prescribe que el nivel mínimo de trato a los extranjeros según el
derecho internacional consuetudinario es el nivel mínimo de trato que se le otorgará a las inversiones 
de los inversionistas de la otra Parte. Los conceptos de "trato justo y equitativo" y "protección y 
seguridad plenas" no requieren un tratamiento adicional o más allá de aquel exigido por ese nivel, y 
no crean derechos sustantivos adicionales. La obligación en el párrafo 1 de otorgar: 
(a) "trato justo y equitativo" incluye, pero no está limitado a, la obligación de no denegar justicia en 
procedimientos penales, civiles o contencioso administrativos, de conformidad con el principio de 
debido proceso incorporado en los principales sistemas legales del mundo; y 
(b) "protección y seguridad plenas" exige a una Parte otorgar el nivel de protección policial que es 
exigido por el derecho internacional consuetudinario. 
3. La determinación que se ha violado otra disposición de este Tratado o de otro acuerdo
internacional, no establece que se ha violado este Artículo. 
4. Con respecto a este Artículo, el nivel mínimo de trato a los extranjeros del derecho internacional
consuetudinario se refiere a todos los principios del derecho internacional consuetudinario que 
protegen los derechos e intereses económicos de los extranjeros. 
The January 2015 version of the TPP is another example. It states: 
For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens as the standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments. The concepts 
of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition 
to or beyond that which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights. 
….35 
The TPP also contains an annex providing additional information on the meaning of the customary 
international law MST. 
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Submissions as respondents and as non-disputing state parties 
States have also clarified the relationship between the FET and MST in their pleadings. Submissions 
made by North and South American states on that issue include the following: 
Argentina The reference to “‘Fair and Equitable Treatment according to the 
Principles of International Law’” is a reference to and coextensive 
with the “minimum standard of objective treatment” under 
“customary international law” and not an “autonomous and 
independent standard.” EDF International 
S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Participaciones 
Argentinas S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, 
award (June 11, 2012), para. 343 (noting the respondent’s position) 
(link not express in the treaty) 
Canada “[T]he Note of Interpretation rejects the interpretation of ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’ … as a standard of fairness autonomous of the 
customary international law minimum standard of treatment. It 
confirms that customary international law is the applicable source of 
law to determine the minimum standard of treatment under Article 
1105(1), and that ‘Article 1105 requires no more, nor less, than the 
minimum standard of treatment demanded by customary 
international law.'” V.G. Gallo v. Government of Canada, PCA 
Case No. 55798, respondent’s counter-memorial (June 29, 2010), 
para. 262. 
(link not express in the treaty) 
Ecuador “The fair and equitable treatment provision also does not create 
new, treaty-based standards, but merely incorporates or references 
the minimum standard of treatment under customary international 
law.” Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. 
Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, track 2 
counter-memorial on the merits of the Republic of Ecuador 
(February 18, 2013), para. 387. 
(link not express in treaty) 
El Salvador “The text of CAFTA makes it clear that ‘Fair and Equitable 
Treatment’ is a ‘floor’ or ‘bottom’ to the acceptable treatment of 
foreign investments – treatment that does not fall below this 
minimum standard does not give rise to a treaty violation, even if 
such treatment may not be considered ideal by a party or a tribunal.” 
Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/23, submission by non-disputing state party, El 
Salvador (January 1, 2012), para. 3. 
(link express in the treaty) 
Guatemala “Article 10.5 of CAFTA limits the Parties’ fair and equitable 
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treatment obligation to the minimum standard of treatment under 
customary international law. A claimant alleging a violation of the 
minimum standard of treatment under customary law bears two 
burdens: first, as examined in this section, it must prove as a matter 
of law that this particular standard of treatment is within the scope of 
the minimum standard of treatment under customary international 
law; second, … it must prove as a matter of fact that the respondent 
State violated that particular standard of treatment.” Railroad 
Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/23, respondent’s counter-memorial on the merits 
(October 5, 2010), para. 346. 
(link express in the treaty) 
Honduras “El trato justo y equitativo’ solamente se menciona con el rango 
de un ‘concepto’ que esta incluido en el ’Nivel Minimo de Trato.’ El 
segundo parrafo del [CAFTA] Articulo 10.5 establece claramente 
que este concepto de ‘trato justo y equitativo’ no puede ir mas alla 
del nivel minimo de trato a los extranjeros segun el derecho 
intemacional consuetudinario.” Railroad Development Corporation 
v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, submission
by non-disputing state party, Honduras (Jan. 1, 2012), para. 5. 
(link express in the treaty) 
United 
States 
Under the NAFTA, “ ‘[F]air and equitable treatment’ … do[es] not 
require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by 
the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of 
aliens.’” ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/00/1, US counter-memorial on competence & liability 
(November 29, 2001), p. 50. 
(link not express in the treaty) 
The provisions of the CAFTA-DR demonstrate the “Parties’ express 
intent to incorporate the minimum standard of treatment required by 
customary international law as the standard for treatment in 
CAFTA-DR Article 10.5. Furthermore, they express an intent to 
guide the interpretation of that Article by the Parties’ understanding 
of customary international law, i.e., the law that develops from the 
practices and opinio juris of States themselves, rather than by 
interpretations of similar but differently worded treaty provisions. 
The burden is on the claimant to establish the existence and 
applicability of a relevant obligation under customary international 
law that meets these requirements.” Railroad Development 
Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, 
submission by non-disputing state party, United States of America 
(January 31, 2012), para. 3.  
(link express in the treaty) 
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In addition to making submissions on the link between the FET and MST, states have also informed 
tribunals of their view of the content of those standards: 
Argentina “Respondent … argues that customary international law recognizes 
neither legitimate expectations nor legal stability as essential 
elements to the Fair and Equitable Treatment standard. (See, 
Respondent‘s Rejoinder, at paras. 249-50, 255). Respondent asserts 
that such broad interpretation extending to the protection of 
legitimate expectation constitutes a legislative expansion inconsistent 
with the contracting parties’ intentions as well as the principles of 
treaty interpretation under Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention.” EDF International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and 
Leon Participaciones Argentinas S.A. v. Argentina Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/23, (award June 11, 2012), para. 359 
(paraphrasing respondent’s arguments) 
Canada The FET/MST obligation sets an “absolute minimum ‘floor below 
which treatment of foreign investors must not fall.” V.G. Gallo v. 
Government of Canada, respondent’s counter-memorial (June 29, 
2010), para. 263.  
The FET/MST obligation “does not require the protection of legitimate 
expectations or transparency.” V.G. Gallo, respondent’s counter 
memorial, p. 95, heading D.1. 
Claimants have “submitted no evidence of practice of the three 
NAFTA Parties regarding the protection of legitimate expectations, let 
alone evidence of practice by any of the other 189 members of the 
United Nations, as would be necessary to prove that a rule of custom 
crystallized through widespread and consistent practice undertaken 
out of a sense of legal obligation.” Mobil Investments Canada Inc. 
and Murphy Oil Corporation v. Government of Canada, respondent’s 
reply post-hearing brief (January 31, 2011), para. 98. 
Guatemala The FET/MST obligation does not “ ‘create additional substantive 
rights.’ ” Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic 
of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, respondent’s counter-
memorial (October 5, 2010), para. 348 (internal citations omitted). 
The claimant has not established, and the State does not accept that 
the FET/MST obligation includes a general obligation not to act 
arbitrarily (para. 397), to act transparently (para. 409), or to protect 
investors’ “legitimate expectations” (paras. 424-428). Railroad 
Development Corporation, respondent’s counter-memorial.  
El Salvador “The text of CAFTA makes it clear that ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ 
is a ‘floor’ or ‘bottom’ to the acceptable treatment of foreign 
investments – treatment that does not fall below this minimum 
standard does not give rise to a treaty violation, even if such 
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treatment may not be considered ideal by a party or a tribunal.” 
Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/23, submission by non-disputing state party, El 
Salvador (January 1, 2012), para. 3. 
The FET/MST obligation does not “ ‘create additional substantive 
rights.’ ” Railroad Development Corporation, submission by non-
disputing state party, El Salvador, para. 3 (internal citations omitted). 
In El Salvador's view, to violate the minimum standard of treatment 
under customary international law included in CAFTA Article 10.5, a 
measure to be able to the State “must be sufficiently egregious and 
shocking – a gross denial of justice, manifest arbitrariness, blatant 
unfairness, a complete lack of due process, evident discrimination, or 
a manifest lack of reasons – so as to fall below accepted 
international standards… Conversely, … the requirement to provide 
‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ under CAFTA Article 10.5 does not 
include obligation of transparency, reasonableness, refraining from 
mere arbitrariness, or not frustrating investors’ legitimate 
expectations.” Railroad Development Corporation, submission by 
non-disputing state party, El Salvador, paras. 6-7. 
Honduras “Debido al origen de 'Nivel Minimo de Trato' en el derecho 
internacional consuetudinario, como un 'piso' absoluto que 
complementa la obligacion de los Estados de otorgar a los 
extranjeros al menos el mismo nivel de trato que los Estados otorgan 
a sus propios nacionales, solam.ente acciones de caracter chocante, 
excesivo, ultrajante, de parte de un Estado, pueden violar el nivel 
minimo de trato, incluyendo el trato justo y equitativo como un 
concepto incluido en el nivel minimo de trato.  
“La Republica de Honduras considera validos los siguientes 
ejemplos especificos de conducta que puede violar el nivel mfnimo 
de trato: una grave denegaci6n de justicia., tma arbitrariedad 
manifiesta, una injusticia flagrante, una completa falta de debido 
proceso, una discriminacion manifiesta, o la ausencia manifiesta de 
las razones para una decision.  Sin embargo, debido a que el 
enfoque debe ser en la conducta del Estado, la Republica de 
Honduras no considera valido ni necesario hacer referencia a las 
expectativas de los inversionistas para decidir si se ha violado el 
nivel minimo de trato.” Railroad Development Corporation v. 
Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, submission by 
non-disputing state party, Honduras (January 1, 2012), paras. 9-10. 
United States “States may modify or amend their regulations to achieve legitimate 
public welfare objectives and will not incur liability under customary 
international law merely because such changes interfere with an 
investor's ‘expectations’ about the state of regulation in a particular 
sector. Regulatory action violates ‘fair and equitable treatment’ under 
the minimum standard of treatment where, for example, it amounts to 
a denial of justice, as that term is understood in customary 
The Global Economic Governance Programme 
University of Oxford 
Page 17 of 35 
Ripe for Refinement: The State's Role in Interpretation of FET, MFN, and Shareholder Rights – Lise Johnson 
© April 2015 / GEG WP101.
international law, or manifest arbitrariness falling below the 
international minimum standard.” TECO Guatemala Holdings LLC v. 
Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23, art. 10.20.2 
submission of a non-disputing state party, United States of America 
(November 23, 2012), para. 6.  
“[A] claim under Article 1105 [FET/MST] would not be admissible if it 
were based only on an allegation of a breach of another provision of 
the NAFTA.” United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Government of 
Canada, UNICTRAL, second article 1128 submission of the United 
States of America (May 13, 2002). 
“Sufficiently broad State practice and opinio juris thus far have 
coincided to establish minimum standards of State conduct in only a 
few areas, such as the requirements to provide compensation for 
expropriation; to provide full protection and security (or a minimum 
level of internal security and law); and to refrain from denials of 
justice. In the absence of an international law rule governing State 
conduct in a particular area, a State is free to conduct its affairs as it 
deems appropriate.” Apotex Holdings Inc. and Apotex Inc. v. United 
States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, counter-memorial 
on merits and objections to jurisdiction of respondent United States 
of America (December 14, 2012), para. 353.  
“To suggest … that Article 1105 [FET/MST] provides a basis for an 
investor to submit a claim under Chapter Eleven for mere frustration 
of a legitimate expectation is nonsensical…. In addition to the fact 
that such a claim lacks support in State practice, the consequences 
of agreeing with Glamis that mere frustration of a foreign investor’s 
legitimate expectations rises to the level of a customary international 
law violation would be momentous…. In sum, the Tribunal should 
reject the notion that the customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment requires States to compensate foreign 
investors merely because their expectations have been frustrated. 
Glamis provides no evidence of such a rule of customary 
international law and, indeed, State practice refutes it.” Glamis Gold 
Ltd. v. United States of America, UNICTRAL, counter-memorial of 
respondent United States of America (September 19, 2006), pp. 180-
84. 
3.2.3 Questions for Discussion 
 What is your position on the meaning of the FET provision and its relationship to the MST
under customary international law?
 What position(s) has your state taken in disputes?
 What has been the outcome?
 Has your state revised your treaty practice over time? If so, how?
 Is there an opportunity for an agreed interpretation to help clarify the meaning of the MST?
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3.3 Shareholder Rights and Remedies 
Many treaties expressly state that they include stocks or equity shares in their definitions of 
“investments”. Based on that language, tribunals have determined that shareholders are not only able 
to bring claims for direct harms to their rights as shareholders (e.g., measures taking their shares or 
their voting rights), but are also able to bring claims and recover damages for government actions that 
negatively impact the company in which they hold shares. These types of claims now make up a 
“substantial part” of ISDS cases.36 
Notably, the approach of tribunals to permit shareholders to secure recovery for harms to the company 
in which they hold shares contrasts with domestic law of many countries in which shareholders are 
generally not able to bring such claims. The common approach in domestic law is to provide that, 
except in certain narrow and carefully defined circumstances, claims alleging and seeking relief for 
harm to a company belong to the company itself. Any recovery secured by the company only reaches 
shareholders after creditors and others with superior claims to the damages are paid.  
By allowing shareholders to bring claims and recover damages for harms to the company in which 
they hold shares, tribunals give rise to risks that 
 one government action can give rise to parallel claims by multiple shareholders in the same
company;
 claims can be brought by foreign shareholders in a company even if the company and the
government agreed to settle the dispute; and
 shareholders covered by an investment treaty will jump ahead of creditors and others who
would otherwise have the same or higher “priority” to recovery under domestic corporate law.
These outcomes threaten to broadly expand states’ exposure to litigation and liability, make it difficult 
for states to ensure that settlement agreements actually dispose of claims, and can prejudice the 
rights and interests of creditors, domestic shareholders, and other individuals and entities who are not 
party to the investor-state arbitration. Consequently, the issue of shareholder claims and recoveries is 
one that experts and international organizations such as the OECD have identified as needing greater 
attention and clarification.  
3.3.1 Tribunal Decisions 
As one study has highlighted, there have been a significant number of cases in which “tribunals have 
expressly held that shareholders can recover” for harms to the company (also described as claims for 
“reflective loss”).37 The study also notes that “[a] number of commentators have described the issue of 
the admissibility of shareholder claims for reflective loss in ISDS as settled law.”38 
Tribunals have permitted shareholder claims for company harms by: 
 100% parent companies,
 majority shareholders,
 minority shareholders,
 indirect shareholders with ultimate control, and
 other indirect shareholders, such as intermediate holding companies.39
The decision on jurisdiction in Total v. Argentina is just one of many examples in which the 
tribunal recognized these types of shareholder claims. It stated: 
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Having found … that the assets and rights that Total claims have been injured in breach of 
the BIT fall under the definition of investments under the BIT, it is immaterial that they belong 
to Argentine companies in accordance with the law of Argentina.40  
3.3.2 State Positions 
Treaty practice 
Many treaties expressly state that shares or equity interests fall within the definition of “investments” 
covered by the treaty. Nevertheless, they typically do not state whether claims for harms to those 
investments are limited to direct claims relating to the shares or equity interests themselves (e.g., 
revocation of shareholding or voting rights), or can extend to claims for reflective loss. (Tribunals have 
interpreted that silence to include that such reflective loss claims are permitted). 
There are, however, a few treaties that try to more expressly address the issue of whether and in what 
circumstances shareholders can bring claims for harm to the company. The NAFTA and US-CAFTA-
DR are notable examples. Under the NAFTA, for example, there are two separate provisions that 
enable shareholders to bring claims. One, Article 1116, allows for claims by shareholders seeking 
relief for harms to their own rights or interests. The second, Article 1117, permits shareholders, in 
certain circumstances, to bring claims for harms to the company: 
The shareholder brings the art. 1117 claim, but the company is the beneficiary of the award. 
Art. 1135(2) ensures that recovery for all art. 1117 claims goes to the company rather than 
the shareholder. Recovery for the company protects company creditors and all shareholders, 
as derivative action mechanisms generally do under domestic law. 
The claimant shareholder must own or control the company directly or indirectly to bring a 
claim under art. 1117. Non-controlling shareholders cannot bring claims under art. 1117. 
Where a shareholder brings an art. 1117 claim, the company is expressly prohibited from 
bringing a claim on its own behalf. As noted by Meg Kinnear, this likely helps avoid the 
possibility that a foreign company could make one ISDS claim while its controlling owner 
makes another. 
Several provisions specifically address and reduce the risk of multiple proceedings. Waiver of 
claims is required as a pre-condition to bringing a claim. which largely precludes the possibility 
of multiple claims. If a claim is brought under art. 1117, both the investor and the company 
must waive the right to initiate or continue local proceedings (art. 1121(2)).Consolidation of 
related shareholder claims under arts. 1116 and 1117 is mandated unless the tribunal finds 
that a disputing party would be prejudiced.41 
Submissions as respondents and as non-disputing state parties 
States have also addressed the issue of shareholder claims as respondents in disputes and as non-
disputing parties. Argentina, for instance, has expressly taken “the position that a shareholder cannot 
bring a claim in respect of harm done to a company merely because the shareholder has been 
prejudiced through a diminution in the value of the shares.”42 Similarly, Canada, Mexico and the 
United States have asserted that a “minority non-controlling shareholder may not bring a claim under 
the NAFTA for loss or damage incurred directly by an enterprise.”43  
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3.3.3 Questions for Discussion 
 What are the rules in your domestic law regarding the rights of shareholders to bring claims
and seek relief for harms to the company in which they hold interests (“reflective loss” claims)?
 What is your position regarding the ability of shareholders to bring ISDS claims for reflective
loss?
 What position has your state taken in disputes?
 What have been the outcomes?
 Has your state revised your treaty practice over time? If so, how?
 Is there an opportunity for an agreed interpretation to help clarify the rights of shareholders to
bring claims for reflective loss?
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Annex 1. Shaping Interpretation of Existing Treaties: The Role 
of Subsequent Agreement and Subsequent Practice  
Treaties are not static instruments but can evolve over time. Crucially, under the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and customary international law on treaty interpretation, states 
themselves can be important forces in shaping that evolution through their express agreement and 
even unilateral conduct. This section provides an overview of relevant rules and principles of treaty 
interpretation in order to highlight the potential role of states in influencing the meaning of their 
investment treaties, and to guide states in how to exercise that power.  
1. General rule of treaty interpretation (VCLT Article 31)
As this section explains, the VCLT gives states an ongoing role as “masters of their treaties”, and 
recognizes their ability to shape the meaning of their treaties over time.  
Article 31 of the VCLT, which also applies as customary international law, provides the general rule on 
treaty interpretation. It states: 
Article 31, GENERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text,
including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion 
with the conclusion of the treaty;  
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of 
the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.  
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of  the treaty 
or the application of its provisions;  
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement 
of the parties regarding its interpretation;  
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.  
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
Unless the treaty states otherwise, Article 31 is thus the first place tribunals must go when interpreting 
treaty language. Article 31 specifies that, along with the text, object and purpose, tribunals need to 
take into account evidence of “subsequent agreement” and “subsequent practice establishing 
agreement” (collectively referred to as “subsequent agreement/practice”) on the meaning of the 
treaties.44  
Subsequent agreement/practice is considered to be “objective evidence of the understanding of the 
parties as to the meaning of the treaty,” and an “authentic means of interpretation” that must be 
applied in interpreting the relevant text.45 As the International Law Commission (ILC) has explained: 
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By describing subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 31 (3) (a) and 
(b) as 
“authentic” means of interpretation [the ILC] recognizes that the common will of the parties, 
from which any treaty results, possesses a specific authority regarding the identification of the 
meaning of the treaty, even after the conclusion of the treaty. The Vienna Convention thereby 
accords the parties to a treaty a role which may be uncommon for the interpretation of legal 
instruments in some domestic legal systems.46 
The term “subsequent” is important to emphasize. It refers to actions and statements after the treaty 
was concluded, making post-treaty agreements and conduct crucially important to interpretation. In 
contrast, evidence of intent at the time of concluding the treaty, such as evidence of negotiating 
history are only “supplementary means” of interpretation that can be considered pursuant to Article 32 
of the VCLT. According to Article 32 of the VCLT, such supplementary means of interpretation may be 
taken into account, but only to (1) “confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31” or 
(2) determine the meaning when application of Article 31 “[l]eaves the meaning ambiguous or 
obscure” or “[l]eads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”47 The VCLT thus accords 
states’ views of the meaning of their treaties over time a greater interpretive weight than their views of 
the meaning during negotiations.  
2. What constitutes subsequent agreement/practice?
A “subsequent agreement” under VCLT Article 31(3)(a) is “an agreement between the parties, 
reached after the conclusion of a treaty, regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of 
its provisions.”48 It need not satisfy any requirement of formality, but should constitute some form of 
“single common act by the parties by which they manifest their common understanding.”49 One 
example of “subsequent agreement” is an exchange of diplomatic notes recording an agreement, or a 
joint interpretive statement.  
“Subsequent practice in the application of the treaty” under VCLT Article 31(3)(b) is “conduct in the 
application of a treaty, after its conclusion, which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding 
the interpretation of the treaty.” While it carries the same force as a “subsequent agreement” under 
Article 31(3)(a), “subsequent practice” under Article 31(3)(b) may be more difficult to establish since it 
is generally made up of conduct that can contribute to an agreement, but that is not embodied in one 
common and relatively clear document or act.  
The “conduct” that can establish subsequent practice under VCLT Article 31 consists of actions and 
omissions (including silence) attributable to a party to a treaty under international law; this can include 
conduct by state organs, high-ranking as well as local officials, and even non-state actors.950 As the 
ILC reports, this can be broad:
[It] includes not only official acts at the international or at the internal level which serve to 
apply the treaty, including to respect or to ensure the fulfillment of treaty obligations, but 
also, inter alia, official statements regarding its interpretation, such as statements at a 
diplomatic conference, statements in the course of a legal dispute, or judgments of domestic 
courts; official communications to which the treaty gives rise; or the enactment of domestic 
legislation or the conclusion of international agreements for the purpose of implementing a 
treaty even before any specific act of application takes place at the internal or at the 
international level.51 
Not all such conduct, nor even all inter-state agreements, however, will establish subsequent 
agreement/practice under Article 31. In order to constitute subsequent agreement/practice that must 
be taken into account under Article 31 of the VCLT, the agreement/practice needs to be regarding the 
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interpretation of a treaty.52 The clearer it is that any agreement or conduct aims to interpret or apply 
the treaty, the more likely it is to be considered as subsequent agreement/practice under the VCLT. 
3. The Legal Effect of Subsequent Practice: Automatically Relevant, Potentially Binding
As noted above, Article 31(3) states that subsequent practice must be taken into account in treaty 
interpretation, along with other elements such as the ordinary meaning of the treaty’s terms and its 
object and character. The fact that it must be taken into account, however, does not mean that it is 
“necessarily conclusive, or legally binding. Thus, when the [ILC] characterized a ‘subsequent 
agreement’ as representing ‘an authentic interpretation’, it did not go quite as far as saying that such 
an interpretation is necessarily conclusive in the sense that it overrides all other means of 
interpretation.”53 
A 2013 report of the ILC, however, recognizes that the treaty parties can give their subsequent 
agreements binding force: 
[S]ubsequent agreements and subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the 
parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty must be conclusive regarding such 
interpretation when “the parties consider the interpretations to be binding upon them”.54 
The intent of the parties to give interpretations such binding effect is particularly clear when the treaty 
itself says that subsequent interpretive agreements entered into by the treaty parties will be binding 
upon them and/or those interpreting and applying the treaty.55 
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Annex 2. Draft Conclusions of ILC on Subsequent Agreement 
and Subsequent Practice 
Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties 
Text of draft conclusions 1–5 provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee at the sixty-fifth session 
of the International Law Commission 
Draft conclusion 1 
General rule and means of treaty interpretation 
1. Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties set forth,
respectively, the general rule of interpretation and the rule on supplementary means of interpretation. 
These rules also apply as customary international law. 
2. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its
terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
3. Article 31, paragraph 3, provides, inter alia, that there shall be taken into account, together with the
context, (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty 
or the application of its provisions; and (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation. 
4. Recourse may be had to other subsequent practice in the application of the treaty as a
supplementary means of interpretation under article 32. 
5. The interpretation of a treaty consists of a single combined operation, which places appropriate
emphasis on the various means of interpretation indicated, respectively, in articles 31 and 32. 
Draft conclusion 2 
Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice as authentic means of interpretation 
Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 31 (3) (a) and (b), being objective 
evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the treaty, are authentic means of 
interpretation, in the application of the general rule of treaty interpretation reflected in article 31. 
Draft conclusion 3 
Interpretation of treaty terms as capable of evolving over time 
Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under articles 31 and 32 may assist in determining 
whether or not the presumed intention of the parties upon the conclusion of the treaty was to give a 
term used a meaning which is capable of evolving over time. 
Draft conclusion 4 
Definition of subsequent agreement and subsequent practice 
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1. A “subsequent agreement” as an authentic means of interpretation under article 31 (3) (a) is an 
agreement between the parties, reached after the conclusion of a treaty, regarding the interpretation of 
the treaty or the application of its provisions.  
 
2. A “subsequent practice” as an authentic means of interpretation under article 31 (3) (b) consists of 
conduct in the application of a treaty, after its conclusion, which establishes the agreement of the 
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty.  
 
3. Other “subsequent practice” as a supplementary means of interpretation under article 32 consists of 
conduct by one or more parties in the application of the treaty, after its conclusion.  
 
Draft conclusion 5  
 
Attribution of subsequent practice 
 
1. Subsequent practice under articles 31 and 32 may consist of any conduct in the application of a 
treaty which is attributable to a party to the treaty under international law. 
 
2. Other conduct, including by non-State actors, does not constitute subsequent practice under articles 
31 and 32. Such conduct may, however, be relevant when assessing the subsequent practice of 
parties to a treaty. 
 
Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties 
 
Texts and titles of draft conclusions 6 to 10 provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee on 27 and 
28 May and on 2 and 3 June 2014 
 
Draft Conclusion 6 
 
Identification of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice 
1. The identification of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 
3, requires, in particular, a determination whether the parties, by an agreement or a practice, have 
taken a position regarding the interpretation of the treaty. This is not normally the case if the parties 
have merely agreed not to apply the treaty temporarily or agreed to establish a practical arrangement 
(modus vivendi). 
 
2. Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3, can take a variety 
of forms. 
 
3. The identification of subsequent practice under article 32 requires, in particular, a determination 
whether conduct by one or more parties is in the application of the treaty. 
 
Draft Conclusion 7 
 
Possible effects of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in interpretation 
 
1. Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3, 
contribute, in their interaction with other means of interpretation, to the clarification of the meaning of a 
treaty. This may result in narrowing, widening, or otherwise determining the range of possible 
interpretations, including any scope for the exercise of discretion which the treaty accords to the 
parties. 
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2. Subsequent practice under article 32 can also contribute to the clarification of the meaning of a 
treaty. 
 
3. It is presumed that the parties to a treaty, by an agreement subsequently arrived at or a practice in 
the application of the treaty, intend to interpret the treaty, not to amend or to modify it. The possibility 
of amending or modifying a treaty by subsequent practice of the parties has not been generally 
recognized. The present draft conclusion is without prejudice to the rules on the amendment or 
modification of treaties under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and under customary 
international law.  
 
Draft Conclusion 8  
 
Weight of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice as a means of interpretation  
 
1. The weight of a subsequent agreement or subsequent practice as a means of interpretation under 
article 31, paragraph 3, depends, inter alia, on its clarity and specificity.  
 
2. The weight of subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), depends, in addition, on 
whether and how it is repeated.  
 
3. The weight of subsequent practice as a supplementary means of interpretation under article 32 may 
depend on the criteria referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2.  
 
Draft Conclusion 9  
 
Agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty  
 
1. An agreement under article 31, paragraph 3 (a) and (b), requires a common understanding 
regarding the interpretation of a treaty which the parties are aware of and accept. Though it shall be 
taken into account, such an agreement need not be legally binding.  
 
2. The number of parties that must actively engage in subsequent practice in order to establish an 
agreement under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), may vary. Silence on the part of one or more parties can 
constitute acceptance of the subsequent practice when the circumstances call for some reaction.  
 
Draft Conclusion 10  
 
Decisions adopted within the framework of a Conference of States Parties  
 
1. A Conference of States Parties, under these draft conclusions, is a meeting of States parties 
pursuant to a treaty for the purpose of reviewing or implementing the treaty, except if they act as 
members of an organ of an international organization.  
 
2. The legal effect of a decision adopted within the framework of a Conference of States Parties 
depends primarily on the treaty and any applicable rules of procedure. Depending on the 
circumstances, such a decision may embody, explicitly or implicitly, a subsequent agreement under 
article 31, paragraph 3 (a), or give rise to subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), or to 
subsequent practice under article 32. Decisions adopted within the framework of a Conference of 
States Parties often provide a nonexclusive range of practical options for implementing the treaty.  
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3. A decision adopted within the framework of a Conference of States Parties embodies a subsequent
agreement or subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3, in so far as it expresses agreement 
in substance between the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty, regardless of the form and 
the procedure by which the decision was adopted, including by consensus. 
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Annex 3. Excerpt from OECD Roundtable on Freedom of 
Investment 19 (15-16 October 2013) 
 
Part IV. Investment treaties over time – Treaty practice and interpretation in a changing world 
 
FOI began their discussions of this subject by noting that investment treaty law, like all systems of law, 
embodies a tension between stability and flexibility. Stability nurtures predictability and compliance, 
while flexibility helps legal systems stay aligned with changing circumstances and evolving needs. A 
background paper prepared by the Secretariat reviews treaty partners’ options as they attempt to find 
the right balance between stability and flexibility and to ensure that their intentions are as clear to 
arbitration panels who interpret treaties and others (e.g. investors) who might want to use the treaties 
for dispute settlement. These options were divided into two categories – ‘exit’ and ‘voice’. 
 
Exit involves the radical move of leaving the treaty system entirely (e.g. by renunciation of treaties), 
thereby eliminating the need for treaty interpretation. The background paper found the following in 
relation to exit as an option for treaty partners: 
 
 Exit is rare, at least for now. To date, unilateral exit from investment treaty obligations has 
been exceptionally rare, with only ten treaties known to have been terminated unilaterally.  
 Investment treaties lock state parties into obligations for extended periods of time. In order to 
investigate how long treaty commitments last, the Secretariat ran a simulation using a scenario 
of immediate and unilateral termination all of the 1900 treaties in the FOI treaty sample as 
soon as such termination is permitted under the treaty. The simulation uses as inputs more 
than 2000 treaties’ provisions on validity periods (these prohibit unilateral termination by treaty 
partners for a fixed period of time) and survival clauses (which extend certain treaty protections 
for specified – usually already made – investments). The simulation shows:  
o Long survival periods for investment treaty obligations. Ninety per cent of the treaties in 
the sample would continue to have some binding effect until at least 2024 – that is, at 
least some investments would continue to benefit from protections provided under the 
treaties until that date. Thus, investment treaties appear, on average, to provide for 
significant stability in treaty- based protections for covered investors via their validity 
and survival clauses.  
o Expanding potential for treaty renunciation. The scope for legal, unilateral renunciation 
of treaties is now high. Simulations run by the Secretariat show that two thirds of 
treaties in the sample could be unilaterally terminated within a year’s time – that is, by 
the end of 2014.  
 
The second option explored in the Secretariat background paper for countries influencing investment 
treaty interpretation is ‘voice’. Voice refers to the use by treaty partners of unilateral or multilateral 
tools to influence the use and interpretation of their investment treaties. The paper examines treaty 
parties’ options for voice and maps relevant treaty practice and produces the following findings. 
 
 Options for voice are numerous. Options for voice include: crafting of clear treaty language 
during negotiations, amicus curiae filings for ISDS cases, other evidence of state practice such 
as model treaties, authoritative interpretations and other statements clarifying the meaning of 
treaty provisions, treaty amendments and protocols and treaty replacement through 
renegotiation.  
 Silence is the dominant approach. The survey of treaty practice shows that by far the most 
common approach is silence on partners’ options for influencing treaty interpretation.  
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 Very few countries avail themselves of their options for voice. Although there are a large range
of options for exercising voice, recourse to these options appears to be numerically small. Very
few countries provide for filings by non-respondent treaty partners during ISDS proceedings
and for authoritative interpretations by treaty partners of treaty texts – fewer than 1 per cent of
the total treaty sample in both cases and these few cases tend to involve at least one signatory
locate in the Americas.
 Treaty renegotiation is rare. A survey of investment treaty replacement through renegotiation
shows that this is also very rare. However, renegotiation of treaties has, to a limited extent,
made treaties both more detailed and more similar to one another.  Participants in FOI
Roundtable 19 made a number of points about exit and voice in an investment law context:
Silence may be golden. One country stated its view that governments should use their treaties
to establish principles that guide treaty interpretation, but, once ratified, countries should
abstain from intervening. Such intervention, under this perspective, looks like de facto
amendment of the investment treaty. In this countries’ view, the key is to develop clear treaty
drafting from the outset in order to preserve government neutrality in the dispute resolution
process. Thus, with respect to opportunities to participate in ongoing interpretations, this
country generally prefers to maintain silence so as to preserve neutrality.  Clarity of treaty
drafting is a cornerstone for an effective system of investment treaty law. A number of
countries stressed the importance of clear drafting of treaties. One country noted that it had
consistently made use of voice mechanism, clarifying the state interpretation on the content of
many treaties and stated that this practice should become more widespread. Another country
offered the view that longer and more detailed treaties are not necessarily clearer treaties.
Legal certainty (e.g. through clear treaty drafting) can be difficult to achieve since not all
scenarios can be anticipated. Some FOI participants highlighted the limits to how much clear
treaty drafting can help in producing more predictable treaty interpretations. They identified a
number of difficulties. First, it is difficult or even impossible to foresee all of the legal issues that
are likely to arise as a treaty is used by investors, arbitrators and counsel. One country clearly
expressed skepticism that treaty drafting could reasonably be expected to provide a sufficient
level of legal certainty for state parties and concluded that some amount of subsequent
interpretation (post-ratification) is likely to be necessary. Another country noted that it exports
capital to one group of countries, but imports it from another group of countries. While this
country proposes one model to all negotiating partners, it is not confident that all issues that
might arise – either for its investors as claimants or for its government in responding to claims
– are covered in its treaties and model.
Different treaty practice for FTAs and BITs. One country noted that it had replaced some of its BITS 
with FTA with investment chapters. Treaty practice for FTAs are substantially different than the 
treaties they replaced. 
Clarifying the relationship between older treaties with older language and treaty interpretation. One 
country noted that, if countries have lots of treaties, fixing one treaty (e.g. through re-negotiation) 
cannot be expected to solve problems of interpretation because the interpretation of the other treaties 
is unaffected. 
Another representative advanced the view that it is a pity that States are not more active in influencing 
how their treaties are interpreted, since they are the major actors in the investment law ‘system’– both 
as treaty drafters and respondents to treaty based investor claims. This participant wondered with 
government silence on this matter was not due to either a lack of ability and capacity of states to 
participate in dialogue on investment treaty law. 
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Request for more work on state-to-state consultations on treaty application. One country asked the 
Secretariat to extend its survey treaty provisions to cover treaty texts that call for state-to-state 
consultations on how treaty language establishing special treatment of prudential, financial, tax 
measures in the context of the treaty. If the respondent invokes some of these areas as a defense, 
then the proceedings are suspended and the treaty partners attempt to reach an agreement on 
whether the special provision applies (e.g. whether the measure is a prudential measures). 
The importance of encouraging UNCITRAL transparency rules, was noted. In particular, some FOI 
participants emphasized the value of providing non-disputing parties (e.g. home-states) with the right 
to make submissions to ISDS proceedings. As the modified rules may become retroactive, they may in 
the future cover more than 1% of the treaties (the percentage of Secretariat treaty sample that provide 
for submissions by respondents). 
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Annex 4. Analysis of Treaties Concluded and Investors 
and Investments That Are Covered 
1. Quantity of Investment Covered
An important starting point for an assessment of risks is an assessment of the treaties that 
are in force, and with whom; this enables countries to begin to understand the investors and 
investments that are covered based on FDI between the countries. For a number of reasons, 
however, this assessment likely underestimates exposure. 
One reason is that, due to treaty shopping and the use of corporate networks, investors 
have various options for securing treaty coverage over any given investment. A treaty with 
one home state can, depending on the language of the treaty, provide coverage for 
parents/beneficial owners and subsidiaries located in states not party to the treaty. Data on 
FDI between two countries can thus fail to capture the full amount of capital flows that are 
effectively covered by the treaty.56  
Additionally, given the wide range of “assets” that are often covered under the definition of 
an “investment”, claimants can bring actions for a range of holdings that would not be 
captured in data on FDI or in data on other types of capital flows.57 Moreover, many of these 
assets – such as securities traded on international markets – are often highly liquid and 
transferrable, meaning that the amount of assets covered by a treaty can change quickly 
and without the knowledge of the host state, making exposure even more difficult to assess 
or control. 
2. Variety of Potential Claimants
While data on the amount of foreign investment covered by investment treaties helps 
government assess the overall amount of potential liability that can arise from international 
law claims, there is another important issue that needs to be addressed: namely, the 
number of claimants that can bring claims alleging that their “investments” had been 
harmed. Under current interpretations of investment treaties, governments may face 
independent treaty claims from a number of different investors (under the same or different 
treaties) relating to an investment in just one project or enterprise. Even foreign minority 
non-controlling shareholders have been able to bring claims alleging harm to the company 
in which they invested, even if the company is majority owned and/or controlled by domestic 
investors or investors from third states. As noted above in Section 3.3, this exposes states 
to risks that multiple claims will be brought relating to the same measure and set of facts. 
For host states, this potential for multiple claims raises a number of significant problems 
including increased litigation costs and increased chances for the investors to prevail and 
the state to lose.  
3. Sector
On a global level, the majority of investment disputes arise in the primary/extractive 
industries and services sectors.58 Foreign investment in manufacturing is less likely to give 
rise to disputes. Comparing these patterns regarding claims with patterns regarding the 
amount of FDI in the three different sectors reveals that there is a disproportionately high 
number of disputes in the extractive industries relative to the amount of FDI that goes into 
that sector, and a disproportionately low number of claims relating to manufacturing as 
compared to the amount of FDI in manufacturing. 
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practice and evolutive interpretation: Techniques of treaty interpretation over time and their diverse 
consequences,” 9 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 443 (2010), n.450. See 
also, e.g., Anthea Roberts, “Power and persuasion in investment treaty interpretation: The dual role of 
states,” 104 American Journal of International Law 179-225 (2010), pp. 200-201.  
4
 Decisions rejecting the claimant’s attempt to import more favorable dispute resolution provisions 
include ICS v. Argentina (importation to bypass 18-month litigation requirement not allowed); Daimler 
v. Argentina (importation to bypass the 18-month litigation requirement not allowed); Wintershall v.
Argentina (same); Plama v. Bulgaria (importation to permit access to ICSID arbitration not allowed); 
Salini v. Jordan (ssame). 
5
 Other decisions reaching conclusions similar to those in Telenor and Tza Yap Shum include the 
majority decision in Austrian Airlines v. Slovakia (but see dissenting opinion of Judge Brower, the 
majority decision in Renta4 v. Russia (but see dissenting opinion of Judge Brower), and Bershader v. 
Russia (but see dissenting opinion by Todd Grierson)). 
6
 This note in the negotiating history is quoted in Andreas R. Ziegler, “The Nascent International Law 
on Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties,” in European Yearbook of 
International Economic Law (2010), 77-101, p. 93. 
7
 Colombia-Switzerland BIT, Ad Article 4, para. 2(2) (emphasis added). 
8
 TPP Draft, January 20, 2015, Investment Chapter, Art II.5(3). 
9
 CETA, Article X.7(4) (emphasis added). 
10
 In some cases, states have not taken a strong position. MTD v. Chile is an example. There, the 
tribunal stated: 
The Claimants have based in part their claims on provisions of other bilateral investment treaties and 
have alleged that these provisions apply by operation of the MFN clause of the BIT. The Respondent 
has not argued against the application of these provisions but, in the case of Article 3(1) of the 
Denmark BIT and Article 3(3) and (4) of the bilateral investment treaty between Chile and Croatia 
(“the Croatia BIT”), the Respondent has qualified its arguments by stating that, even in the event that 
the clause concerned would apply, the facts of the case are such that it would not have been 
breached. Because of this qualification in the Counter-Memorial and the Rejoinder, the Tribunal 
considers it appropriate to examine the MFN clause in the BIT and satisfy itself that its terms permit 
the use of the provisions of the Denmark BIT and Croatia BIT as a legal basis for the claims submitted 
to its decision. 
MTD v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, May 25, 2004, para. 100. 
11
 EDF et al. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, Award, June 11, 2012, para. 216. 
12
 Guarachi v. Bolivia, Award, January 31, 2014, para. 326. 
13
 Perenco v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, June 30, 2011, para. 79 
(internal citations omitted). 
14
 Apotex Holdings and Apotex Inc. v. United States, Award, August 25, 2014, para. 9.71. 
15
 Philip Morris Brands et al. v. Uruguay, Uruguay’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, September 24, 2011, 
para. 97. 
16
UNCTAD, Series on International Investment Agreements II: FET, p. 43 (2012). 
17
Glamis Gold v. United States, UNCITRAL, Award, June 8, 2009, para. 616. 
18
Cargill v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, para. 103. 
19
Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38(1)(b). 
20
Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: 
Rules (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. xlv (citing International Law Association, Final Report of 
the Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, Statement of Principles 
Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, Report of the Sixty-Ninth 
Conference, London, 2000, commentary (b) to Principle 12, p. 731).  
21
 ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, May 22, 2007, para. 258. 
22
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23
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57
 In light of the relevance of the amount of foreign investment to exposure to claims, Figures 1 and 2 
show the amount of FDI stock in South and Central American countries, respectively. Figures 2 and 3 
illustrate the amount of FDI stock as a percentage of domestic GDP in South and Central American 
countries.  
58
 See UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note: Recent Trends in IIAs and ISDS, No. 1 (February 2015), p. 7 
(“About 61 per cent of cases filed in 2014 relate to the services sector. Primary industries account for 
28 per cent of new cases while the remaining eleven per cent arose out of investments in 
manufacturing. Looking at the industries in which investments were made, the most numerous was 
generation and supply of electric energy (at least eleven cases), followed by oil, gas and mining (ten), 
construction (five) and financial services (three).”). See also ICSID, The ICSID Caseload – Statistics 
(Issue 2012-2), p. 12 (showing sectoral distribution of all cases under the ICSID Convention and 
under the Additional Facility Rules). 
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